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Abstract: 
A  monetary union requires that a common central bank be shared among multiple nations, where 
governments  and  households  may  well  be  heterogeneous  across  national  borders.  A  dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium model of a two-country monetary union  provides a natural setting 
in  which  to examine the implications of agent  heterogeneity for  price-level determination. The 
model  suggests,  first,  that  significant  heterogeneity  in  government  fiscal  policies  can  be 
accommodated within a monetary union.  Second, household heterogeneity gives monetary policy 
a  reallocative  dimension  which  affects  pnce-level  determination.  For  example,  dissimilar 
preferences for holding money  tend to enhance the potency of a monetary contraction to lower 
inflation.  Fiscal federalism may reverse this effect. 1. Introduction 
Recent  research  in  the theory of  price level determination  has emphasized  the 
interdependence  between monetary and fiscal policies in achieving  price stabil- 
ity.  This interdependence takes on new dimensions in a monetary union, since 
a common central bank is shared by multiple national governments,  which are 
likely to be heterogeneous in the fiscal policies they pursue.  A monetary union is 
a relatively novel arrangement, and its implications for price-level determination 
have not been much explored.'  A further dimension is added by the fact a mone- 
tary union involves households which may well be heterogeneous across national 
borders.  Heterogeneity in households' demands for money gives monetary policy 
a reallocative dimension, which can alter its effects on the price level. 
I  analyze price level determination  in  the context of  a dynamic stochastic 
general  equilibrium model of  a  two-country  monetary  union.  My analysis has 
its roots in the classic work in price-level determination by Sareent and Wallace 
(1981), and builds on the recent research in this area by Leeper (1991 and 1993), 
Sims (1994) and Woodford (1995 and 1996).'  The analysis is distinct from recent 
research on public finance aspects of  monetary unions, such as Sibert (1992 and 
1994) and Canzoneri and Diba  (1991).~  Given the centrality of  price stability 
in policy discussions of monetary union in  Europe, it is perhaps useful to focus 
on this issue separately and apply a modeling strategy developed  for this pur- 
pose. This analysis describes distinct classes of  equilibria under different classes 
of  policy rules.  Monetary policy is characterized by a reaction function, describ- 
ing the degree to which the common central bank is willing to raise the nominal 
interest rate to fight inflation.  The fiscal policies of  both countries are similarly 
characterized by a reaction function of  lumpsum taxes to the size of  government 
debt. The analysis identifies threshold values in the policy parameters that divide 
different classes of  equilibria. 
One class of  equilibria exists in the case where monetary policy is willing to 
fight  inflation vigorously and the national fiscal authorities are prevented from 
letting their debt grow too quickly. In this e~~uilibrium  the price level is insulated 
from jumps in the debts of  the fiscal authorities, and the central bank is able to 
safeguard price stability. This may be viewed as a rationalization of  the proposed 
monetary and fiscal rules for  the European Monetary Union in the Maastricht 
'See  Leeper 1993 and Wopdford 1996 for some exploration of this issue. 
2~ee  also Aiyagari  and Gertler  (1985).  The modeling strategy  employed in  this paper  is 
adapted from Leeper (1991). 
3~ee  also Buiter and Kletzer  (1990), Casella and Feinstein (1988), Canzoneri and Roubini 
(1993), Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1994), and Kletzer (1995). Treaty, although the analysis suggests some modifications to the treaty's rules. 
With  the limits of  the policy rules, the budgetary policies pursued by the na- 
tional fiscal governments can be quite heterogeneous and yet be consistent with 
the single seignorage policy of  the central bank. 
The likelihood that households are heterogeneous across borders in their pref- 
erences for holding money gives monetary policy a new redistributive dimension. 
This redistribution of  wealth  between households in turn can affect  the impli- 
cations of  monetary policy for  pricelevel determination.  Such heterogeneity is 
a dimension not present  in  existing  price-level determination literature,  which 
has to date focused on closed economies with a single representative agent.  A 
monetary contraction here tends to lower the wealth of  the household whose pref- 
erence for money holding is lower.  This wealth redistribution has real effects on 
consumption and money demand.  In particular, aggregate money demand here 
tends always to move endogenously in  a direction to enhance the potency of  a 
monetary contraction in lowering inflation, although the magnitude of  this effect 
in the present model appears to be fairly small. 
A second class of  equilibria exists if monetary policy is not sufficiently aggres- 
sive in fighting inflation and one fiscal authority is not fiscally responsible. In this 
equilibrium a contractionary monetary policy perversely produces inflation. Fur- 
ther, a rise in debt of  the fiscally irresponsible government affects the price level 
for  all members of  the union.  This result may be understood  as a two-country 
version of  a finding familiar from the Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic of  Sar- 
gent and Wallace (1981), or it may be understood in terms of  the fiscal theory of 
price level determination more recently developed in Sims (1994) and Woodford 
(1995). 
A third case explores an equilibrium which combines both aggressive monetary 
policy and irresponsible fiscal policy.  This hybrid equilibrium becomes possible 
in  the context  of  a  particular  type of  fiscal  federalism.  In  this equilibrium a 
monetary contraction is associated with inflation, despite the aggressive stance 
of  the central bank.  While heterogeneity in  households'  money demands gives 
monetary policy the same reallocative dimension as above, fiscal federal transfers 
can potentially reverse the implications of  this wealth reallocation for aggregate 
money demand. 
The next section of  this paper develops a model of  a two-country monetary 
union and discusses the role of  fiscal solvency in price level determination.  Sec- 
tions three through five,explore  the three classes of  equilibria.  Section six con- 
cludes. 2. The Model 
This section constructs a simple framework for analyzing a hypothetical monetary 
union, in which two distinct countries share a common central bank.  One new 
feature of  modeling a monetary union is that a specification of  monetary policy 
involves decisions about how  to allocate between the two countries the seignor- 
age revenue as well as the open market  purchases of  national bonds.  A second 
feattare is that money demands of  households may differ across national borders. 
Finally, it is the joint solvency condition of  the two governments that matters 
for  price-level determination,  not each separately.  The framework is simplified 
sufficiently to allow analytical solutions in most cases and thereby make results 
more transparent. 
2.1. The Consumer 
Consider two countries.  Country one, for example, is populated by an infinitely- 
lived household, receiving a constant endowment of  jjl  units of  the common con- 
sumption good each  period.  The household consumes clt of  this endowment. 
There  is one  fiat  currency  issued  by  the common central  bank.  It earns no 
interest, and  real  balances provide consumers with utility separably  from con- 
sumption.  The household in country one holds real balances, mlt, which is the 
ratio of  nominal balances, Mlt,and the common price level, pt.  The household 
may also save one-period nominal government debt issued by the government of 
country one, Bllt,  or that issued by the government of  country two, Bzlt. These 
have real values bllt  and bZlt, and yield nominal interest of  Rlt and R2t. Since 
cross-border asset trade is limited to non-contingent government debt, asset mar- 
kets are incomplete and households are unable to insure against shocks affecting 
countries asymmetrically. The household pays r1t units of  the consumption good 
in lumpsurn taxes each period. Utility is discounted at the rate P, in the interval 
(Oil). 
The household solves the following probl2m: 
where  Mt > 0,  Bllt 5  0, BZlt 2  0 
The utility function takes the form: Optimal behavior by households requires they plan to fully utilize their total 
wealth.  This transversality condition requires that the wealth of  the consumer 
not explode.  This combined  with the consumer's  budget constraint implies an 
intertemporal budget constraint: 
Here W1t  is the nominal value of  pred.etermined, beginning of  period wealth. The 
real rate of  return on bonds is represented by rt = Rt (pt/pt+l). 
The first-order necessary conditions require that Rlt = Rzt,  indicating agents 
regard  the bonds issued  by  different governments as perfect substitutes.  Here- 
after, all first-order equations will  refer to the common interest  rate, Rt.  The 
remaining first-order conditions reduce to the following: 
where inflation is defined  as ~t  = &.  Equation  (5) is a liquidity preference 
relation, where  real money  demand  increases with consumption and decreases 
with the interest cost of  holding money. The condition resembles a standard LM 
equation, except it depends only on the private part of output. Equation (6) is 
essentially an intertemporal optimizat'on-based version of an IS equation. 
The household of  country two faces an analogous  problem,  with analogous 
Euler equations.4 
'Since  home  and foreign bonds are perfect  substitutes,  there is  an indeterminacy  in the 
allocations  of  portfolios.  The following allocation rule is specified, saying  agents split  their 
portfolios between the two t  pes of bonds in the same proportion as  they comprise the total 
body of  issues outstanding: Y 
B  -  B  Bl,t+Bi2:L+B  L,nt - B2,t+B2~+BZml.  Such  a portfolio would be the average result of  random 
purchases in the bond market. 2.2. The National Governments 
Now consider each of  the two national governments.  They have no control over 
the creation of  money.  The government in country one uses direct  lumpsum 
taxes, rlt,  transfers from the common central bank, vlt, and new issues of debt to 
finance the constant level of  purchases each period, 7j1, all subject to  the following 
budget constraint: 
where Blpt is issues of  country-one government debt held  by  private agents of 
either nationality, Bllt + B12t. 
Fiscal policy is characterized here by the following tax reaction function. 
The parameters 711  and  describe how tax revenues collected by the national 
government  respond to changes in debt held by private households and that held 
by the central bank, respectively.  (The counterparts for  the foreign government 
are 712 and 722.)  The size of  these response parameters in this reaction function 
define the degree of  fiscal  responsibility.  The term +t  represents a  mean zero 
i.i.d.  innovation to tax policy.  An analogous rule is specified for the government 
in  country two.  The price-level determination  literature typically  is criticized 
for  imposing such exogenous  policy rules  as these, since it  is usually assumed 
rules cannot be imposed in practice and they do not consider strategic behavior. 
However, it could be argued that the present case is especially well suited to this 
approach.  Rules governing both monetary and fiscal policy have in reality been 
proposed for the European Monetary  Jnion, and it is these rules that are at the 
heart of  current policy debates. 
2.3. The Common Central Bank 
The common central bank is distinct from each of  the national governments.  It 
controls the issue of  new money, Mt,  through open market purchases of  bonds 
issued  by  the national governments.  The fact the central bank must hold  and 
trade bonds issued by the two national fiscal authorities generates a certain link between fiscal  and monetary policies.  The central  bank, itself,  does not issue 
debt, nor does it levy  taxes.  Instead it returns this interest  revenue back  to 
the national governments, in the form of  rebates vlt and vzt. The central bank's 
budget constraint is as follows: 
Monetary policy is characterized by a reaction function, specifymg that inter- 
est rates be targeted in response to inflation: 
0t -N (O,03) 
The policy parameter a1 specifies the degree to which the common central bank is 
willing to raise the nominal interest rate to fight inflation. This reaction function 
may  be  thought of  as coming from an optimizing central bank that wishes to 
smooth price level and the interest rate. The parameter a1 represents the relative 
weight of  these two variables in the objective function. The term Qt represents a 
mean zero i.i.d. innovation to monetary policy. 
An additional dimension to monetary policy unique to a monetary union is the 
composition of  the central bank's purchases in open market operations.  For the 
present time, the central bank is specified to buy the two types in equal shares: 
Blmt =  B2mt.  (2.11) 
Note that by determining the purchases of  bonds, this rule determines the allc- 
cation of  seignorage. 
For the present time, it is assumed that the central bank rebates all interest 
revenues directly  back to the government  that paid them.  This means rebates 
and expenditure are set as follows: 
Finally is the money market-clearing condition: 2.4. Fiscal Solvency, the Distribution of  Household Wealth, and the 
Price Level 
Government solvency conditions apply here in a form somewhat different from a 
closed-economy setting. Any government solvency conditions necessary for equi- 
librium in this model arise from the requirement that optimizing households be 
willing to hold government debt. In other words, they arise from the transversal- 
ity condition combined with the intertemporal budget constraint of the household 
optimization problems. In the present model, these are represented in the wealth 
condition of  equations 2.3 and 2.4 and the counterparts for the household of  the 
other country: 
W2t  Rt-i(~Bi2t-i+B22t-i)+M2t-i  where -  = -- 
Pt  Pt 
These conditions define two distinct  wealth conditions, one for  each of  the two 
representative households.  In the m.ore typical one-country case, with one gov- 
ernment  and one household, the household wealth condition is identical to the 
government solvency constraint. In that case it is irrelevant whether the one con- 
dition is regarded as describing government solvency or household wealth. Here, 
in contrast, there are two distinct household wealth conditions.  While the sum 
of  these are the same as the sum of  the two government solvency conditions, the 
household conditions are distinct in t.he way they group types of debt. As a result 
the household wealth conditions have somewhat different  implications than the 
government solvency conditions. 
One implication is to impose a requirement on the cross-border distribution of 
bonds between households.  Even if  the level of  debt issued by both governments 
is stable, an equilibrium can be undermined if the bond holdings of  one country 
explodes upward while that of the ot.her c ountry explodes downward. This cross- 
border distribution of  wealth between households is an additional dimension of 
equilibrium in a monetary union. 
Secondly, the condition would permit an equilibrium in which one governmen- 
t's debt grows explosiv~ly  and the wealth of  the other government grows at the 
same explosive rate, so that the latter purchases the debt of  the former. This point 
is emphasized in Woodford (1996). However, while the model does not explicitly 
preclude such an equilibrium, it is d.ifficult to conceive that a government would willingly  purchase continuously the debt of  another without ever  being repaid. 
Even the simplest specification of  an  optimizing government would introduce a 
government transversality condition that would  preclude such a case.  Such an 
equilibrium will not  be explored in this paper, which rules it out  by  requiring 
Blpt > 0 and B2pt > 0. 
It has been argued  in Woodford  (1995 and 1996) that a household  wealth 
condition can usefully be regarded  as the equilibrium condition determining the 
equilibrium  price level.  The condition  specifies that given  the predetermined 
nominal value of  net government liabilities Wlt or Wzt on the left-hand side, and 
given expectations at date t regarding current and future values of  relative quan- 
tities and relative prices on the right hand side, there is a specific price level that 
makes the equality hold.  If  the real quantities on the right side are inconsistent 
with the nominal value of  current government labilities at the current price level, 
then the price level must adjust.  In intuitive terms, if  a national government is 
fiscally irresponsible, in that it cuts taxes and increases bond financing without 
plans to compensate with future tax increases, this makes domestic households 
think they are wealthier. Since their hudget set seems to have expanded, house- 
holds will wish to raise consumption.  But this will only generate excess aggregate 
demand, requiring a rise in the price level to clear the goods market.  This price 
level will lower the real value of  wealth until aggregate demand is consistent with 
aggregate supply. 
2.5. The Linearized System 
A more practical analysis of  fiscal rules in a monetary union will be facilitated by 
looking at a linearized version of  the model. Linearization will provide convenient 
demarcation between contrasting classes of  equilibria. 
A complete dynamic system is specified by equations (2.1-2.14) and counter- 
parts for the other country.  This system  is linearized around an initial steady 
state where output is symmetric across the two countries.  This linear  system 
can be transformed  into a more tractable six-variable system that can be dealt 
with analytically. The variables of  this trausformed system are consumption (cl), 
inflation (T),  country-one debt held by the central bank (bl,),  debt issued by the 
government in country one held in private hands (bl,  = bll +  b12),  privately-held 
debt issued by  the government in country two (b2p  = b21 + b22), and finally, the 
net foreign assets of  households in country one (b,  = bZ1 -  b12). Note that all 
variables of  the linearized system are marked by tildes, indicating deviations from 
steady state.  Steady state values of  the variables are marked by  overbars.  The terms elt and e2t are expectational errors. 
See Appendix A for B1,  B2,  and H. 
Typically, the existence of  a unique equilibrium will coincide with the number 
of  unstable roots being equal to the number of  endogenous expectational error 
terms, which here is two (Blanchard and Kahn, 1980).  The compacted system 
here was derived so that the six roots of  the system may be read off the diagonal 
of  the coefficient matrix A1:  1, alp,  1, 8  -  In,  $ -  712, and $.  Further, this 
compacted system captures all the roots of  interest from the full 22-variable sys- 
tem, since the remaining 16 roots are all zeros in the full model. The sixth root, 
$ , is always greater than unity, since 4 is always less than unity; the first and 
third roots are necessarily exactly unity.  Thus for  the number of  unstable roots 
to equal two, it is necessary to choosc  policy function parameter values crl  ,  yll  and 
712 so that exactly one of  the remaining roots exceed unity.  It may be recalled 
that crl specifies the responsiveness of  the monetary authority to inflation, while 
yll,and 712 specify the responsiveness of  the national fiscal authorities to their 
respective debt  stock^.^,  - 
 h he two unit roots reflect two nonstationarities in the steady state, which indicates transitory 
shocks have permanent effects. The first simply reflects the specification of monetary policy as 
permanent shifts in money supply. The second reflects the incompleteness of asset markets, which While roots counts are useful in identifying classes of  equilibria,  complete 
proofs of existence and uniqueness of  these equilibria are more involved.  In par- 
ticular, the root-counting method of  Blanchard and Kahn (1980) would  require 
that expectational terms enter without linear  dependencies, which is not  true 
here.  See  appendix B for  a  discussion  of  a  method for  proving existence and 
uniqueness in the present situation and the proofs for each of  the classes of equi- 
libria presented in the paper. 
3. Case 1:  Maastricht Equilibrium 
The linearized model above suggests there is a knife-edge threshold value for each 
of  the policy parameters.  The nature of  the equilibrium generally depends on 
whether the fiscal authorities'  tax response to debt, ylland 712, exceed the value 
1  -  1, which is the long-run real interest rate. Large responses indicate that gov-  P 
ernrnents are fiscally responsible, in the sense that they take on the responsibility 
for making sure debt does not grow too quickly.  The nature of  the equilibrium 
also depends on whether the monetary policy response to inflation, cul, exceeds 
$.  A  large response indicates the central  bank  values low  inflation relative to 
smoothing interest  rates, and  thus is  willing to fight  inflation  aggressively  by 
raising the interest rate. 
Consider first  a case in  which national governments act fiscally responsibly 
and the common central bank values price stability highly . This case generally 
reflects the intentions for the European Monetary Union laid out in the Maastricht 
Treaty, and so it is here referred to as  the Maastricht Equilibrium.  In particular, 
suppose regarding fiscal  policy, taxes must  respond to debt  by  more than the 
1  steady state real  interest  rate:  7n :>  B -  1 and 712 > 8  -  1  And  regarding 
monetary  policy, suppose  that the nominal  interest  rate is raised in  response 
to inflation in a proportion greater than the steady-state interest rate plus one: 
a1 > $. In terms of  the model framework above, there will be exactly two large 
roots:  the second root, alP, and the sixth, while but the fourth and fifth roots, 
are restricted to non-contingent government bo ~ds.  If  asset markets were assumed complete, 
shocks would affect wealths of  both countries symmetrically. This result is clearly counterfactual, 
and it  would  preclude analysis of  the cross-country heterogeneity of  households.  It has been 
demonstrated in Baxter and Crucini (1995) t.hat the usual solution methods of linearizing around 
an initial steady state can still can be employed in such a  case, so long as-the state space is 
expanded to track the distribution of  wealth between the two agents (here b,).  The fact that 
the ha1  steady state is afTec,ked by  the model dynamics suggests that the linear approximation 
will be less good in the long run, but for ardysis of  short-run dynamics this is not likely to be 
a significant problem. $ -  ~1  and I: -  711, are less than unity.Appendix B contains the proof that this 
arrangement does imply a unique stable equilibrium. 
Proposition 1:  Price stability.  In the Maastricht Equilibrium defined 
above, prices are stable in the following sense: inflation is insulated from jumps in 
government debt and the central bank has the ability to  control inflation through 
its monetary policy. 
Proof: Much can be learned from the stability condition associated with the 
unstable second root, which becomes a condition for equilibrium: 
This condition states that current inflation  is a function only of  changes in mon- 
etary policy (Ot), and not of  changes in fiscal policy (&t  or  In particular, it 
stipulates that a monetary contraction (positive Ot) translate directly into a fall 
in inflation. 
Figure 1 illustrates a contractionary monetary shock (Bt=O.Ol), where impulse 
responses are plotted as percent deviations from steady state.g Money supply falls 
and lowers inflation. Note that in Figure 1 both governments raise taxes. This is 
because the open market operations implied by  this monetary contraction raise 
the level of  government debt in private hands.  The fiscal rules then require a rise 
in taxes to keep debt from growing explosively. This fiscal response is an integral 
part of  establishing the equilibrium.  In fact, from the perspective of  a general 
equilibrium model, it cannot truly be said whether it is the fall in money supply 
or the rise in taxes that is the channel through which the shock Ot  makes inflation 
fall. The quantity theory of  money oflers a story of  the former channel. The fiscal 
theory of  price level determination of  Woodford (1995), discussed in the previous 
section, offers a story for the latter channel. Recall that in this story a rise in taxes 
lowers household wealth and hence lowers demand for goods.  Equilibrium in the 
goods market then requires a fall in the pr'ce level to raise real household wealth. 
But regardless of  the story to explain the equilibrium, the model suggests policy 
responses within certain boundaries are integral components of  that equilibrium. 
If  the features of  this equilibrium are desirable to policy makers in Europe, 
the model suggests some justification for policy rules that mandate the policy re- 
sponses that support the equilibrium.  However, the policy specifications used in 
'parameters  are  set at:  ax  = 1.2, 711  = 721 = 0.2, a, = 0.02, a2  = 0.01, 'ij,  = y2 = 1, 
- 
g1  =  jj2 =  0.3, 51 =  iz  = 0.306 (to reproduce realistic steady-state debt levels), P = 0.99. The 
shock is  Ot =  0.01 for t=l and 0 for  t>l. the model above suggest forms for rules somewhat different from those proposed in 
the Maastricht Treaty. For instance, it is not necessary to impose an absolute ceil- 
ing on debt, as is specified in the treaky. It is sufficient to impose a limit on the rate 
debt grows or to impose a rule that has this effect  711  > 1  -  1 and 712 > -L -  1 .  (  0  P  ) 
Further, the monetary authority need not hold  price-stability  as its sole objec- 
tive. It may value interest-rate smoothing to some degree, so long as the relative 
weighting of  price stability, cwl,  is sufficiently large  a1  > '  .  (  P) 
One concern with  a  monetary  union  is  how  a single central  bank can set 
seignorage to be consistent with the fiscal behavior of  multiple fiscal authorities 
that may be heterogeneous in their fiscal behavior. But such fiscal heterogeneity 
is not a problem in the current class of  equilibria.. 
Proposition 2: Government heterogeneity. Most types of  heterogeneity 
in the behavior of  fiscal authorities (defined in terms of  policy parameters in the 
hscal rules) are irrelevant for the equilibrium price level in this class of  equilibria.. 
First,  the absolute sizes  of  their  debt  need  not  be  the same in  steady state. 
Second, the responsiveness of  governinents to the portion of  debt held in private 
hands need not be equal, so long as they both are sufficiently large.  Further, no 
restriction at all needs be placed on the responsiveness to the remaining portion 
of  debt, that part held by the central bank. 
Proof: In the proof of  the existence of  the Maastricht Equilibrium, the only 
restriction  on  fiscal rules  were  that yll > 1  -  1 and  712 > 1  -  1.  So  it  is  P  P 
permissible that yo1  # 702,  meaning that steady state levels of  debt could  be 
any value.  Secondly, it is possible that 711  # 712, implying different  responses 
to privately-held debt.  Further no assumption  at all was made for  722, 
controlling the responsiveness to debt held by  the central bank.. 
The last portion of  the proposition depends on the particular open market 
operations  rule specified in  the model.  To this point  it has been assumed  the 
central bank was careful to allocate its open market operations evenly between 
the bonds of the two countries, which basicdlly means the seignorage benefits were 
evenly distributed.  Consider what happens if  instead the common central bank 
treats both bonds as perfect substitutes.  In that case, the share of  country-one 
bonds in the purchases of  the central bank would be expected to be on average 
equal the share of  these bonds in the market in general.  Thus the open market 
operations allocation  rule, equation (11) needs to be replaced  by the following 
rule: 
f The model cannot be easily solved analytically under this rule, but the case can 
be explored numerically in the calibraked version of  the model used in Figure 1. It 
is found that a rule that ignores debt held by the central bank does not eliminate 
the third unstable root. But if  712 and 722 are set to exceed the value $ -  1, as are 
711  and 721, then the Maastricht Equilibrium is restored.  As a general principle, 
then, the proper specification of  a fiscal rule depends in part on the specification 
of  the open market operations rule. 
In addition the heterogeneity among fiscal authorities, a second concern in a 
monetary union is potential heterogeneity bztween households, which may differ 
in their preferences for holding money.  Such household  heterogeneity is usually 
not an issue in a closed economy model, but it is a central issue in a multi-country 
setting. 
Proposition 3:  Household heterogeneity.  If  households  have different 
demands for money, innovations in monetary policy may redistribute wealth be- 
tween  households of  the two countries.  This redistribution  of  wealth between 
households with contrasting money demands may in turn affect aggregate money 
demand and thereby affect the implications of monetary policy for the equilibrium 
price level.  In particular, aggregate money demand in the present model changes 
endogenously  in a direction  that always makes monetary policy more potent in 
affecting inflation.  A related implication is that monetary policy has asymmetric 
real effects on consumption in the two countries. 
Proof:  The second  stability condition, associated  with the sixth unstable 
root, states that consumption must respond to changes in the net foreign asset 
position of  the household. When combined with the first stability condition, this 
condition reduces to the simple statement: 
which states that consumption in country one must change in direct proportion 
to the current  real  net  foreign  asset  position of  households in  country one in 
interest bearing assets.  This proportion,  a -  1, is the steady-state real interest 
rate, so as to prevent ifiterest bearing debt to the other country from growing 
explosively.  Maintaining dynamic stability  of  the cross-border  distribution of 
household wealth is essential to the existence of  an equilibrium, as was specified 
in the intertemporal wealth conditions discussed in the previous section. In turn, the relative wealth position may be solved in terms of  lagged values 
as: 
which suggests that relative wealth of  households is affected by monetary policy 
shocks  (Ot).  (<*is  defined in the appendix.) Or solving forward: 
t-l 
It is clear that t8 > 0 if  a1 > a2  and given that the model is linearized around a 
symmetric steady state (in which El =  Fa). So a contractionary monetary policy 
(positive Ot ) raises the relative wealth position of  the household that has a higher 
demand for money, and thus raises the consumption of  that household. 
Using the liquidity preference relation  (2.5),  it can  - be shown that real money 
demand  moves with consumption and  hence  with bzt.  So  in  a contractionary 
monetary shock, the money-loving a,gent controls a larger fraction of  aggregate 
wealth, total real money demand will rise. 
Solving for the path of  nominal money supply. 
The term  $ (al -  a2)  t8  is always  non-negative, regardless of  which  country is 
the relative money  lover.  And  it  becomes larger  as  the absolute value of  the 
difference between a1  and a2  rises.  So in the case of  a contractionary monetary 
policy (Ot > O), the new wealth effect will moderate the degree to which nominal 
money supply must decrease.  And in the case of  a monetary expansion  (Ot < 0) 
it will moderate the degree to which  nominal  money supply must increase.  In 
either direction, the relative wealth effect makes changes in monetary supply more 
potent in affecting inflation. 
See again Figure 1 for an illustration of  this effect for a contractionary mon- 
etary policy shock  (Ot  = .01).  The households  are het,erogeneous in their de- 
mand for money, wherdcountry one has twice the money' demand of  country two 
(al = 0.02, a2 = 0.01).  The parameter values were chosen so that the initial 
steady state levels of  money  in  the model roughly  replicate  M1 as a  ratio to GDP in Germany and Italy, respectively.  Relative wealth of  the money-loving 
household does indeed rise a small amount, since the negative seignorage tax as- 
sociated with the fall in price level affects more heavily the household that holds 
more money. This rise in relative weidth is reflected in the rise of  consumption of 
the money-loving household and a rise in its money demand.  Consumption falls 
an equal amount in the other household and its money demand falls.  But since 
money  demand of  the money-lover is larger  in  proportion to its consumption, 
aggregate money demand summed over both households rises. The fact that the 
fall in nominal money supply induces real money demand to fall, suggests the 
equilibrium price level that clears the money market must fall all the more. 
Calibrated with the parameter values above, which produce realistic steady 
state real money levels, this wealth effect can be seen in the figure to be fairly 
small.g  The effect  would be larger for economies in  which steady state money 
demand is larger  relative to consumption, or economies in which the elasticity 
of  money demand to changes in wealth is larger relative to that of  consumption. 
There is probably no reason why the effect here should be peculiar to a monetary 
union.  Heterogeneity between different  types of  agents within a single national 
economy could also give rise to the redistributive wealth effects which are seen here 
to alter subtly the implications of  monetary policy for price-level determination. 
4. Case 2: Bailout Equilibrium 
In the Maastricht clays of  equilibria above, it was seen that significant heterogene- 
ity in government fiscal policies can be accommodated within a monetary union, 
without threatening certain desirable properties of  the price-level determination 
process.  However, the model does suggest the existence of  other equilibria, in 
which some types of  fiscal behavior by one member government can produce in- 
flationary  problems throughout  the monetary union.  Consider a case in which 
one fiscal government  is fiscally irresponsible, in the sense that it does not raise 
taxes sufficiently  in  the face of  rising  debt  to prevent  fiscal  insolvency.  Sup 
pose also that the common central baiik  ~alues  interest-rate smoothing  as well 
as price-smoothing.  It either  pursues a simple interest-rate  pegging  rule, or it 
 he present case in which money preferences irl  country one are double those of country two 
may be compared to a benchmark case with the same total money demand, but with symmetric 
preferences  between  the two countries.  Compared  to this benchmark, the approximate  one- 
percent drop in infiation (ot/=  .01)  requires a contraction in  nominal money supply that is 0.1 
percent smaller in the case of heterogeneous preferences than in the benchmark case. However, 
there are conditions under which this small effect can be greatly multiplied, as will  be shown in 
the final class of equilibria. only cautiously raises the interest rate when inflation is observed.  In terms of  the 
policy rules in the model, this scenario is described by 711 < $ -  1, 712  >  -  1,  P 
and ol  < $. So the fourth root of  the model, $ -  Tn, is greater than unity, but 
the second  root, alp,  now  has been  brought inside the unit circle.  There are 
still a total of  two large roots. Appendix B contains the proof that this arrange- 
ment does imply a unique stable equilibrium.  Howevyr, this equilibrium has some 
unusual properties, which suggest a label for this case of  Bailout Equilibrium. 
Proposition 4: Price instability. In this Bailout equilibrium, inflation is 
affected by jumps in government  debt of  the fiscally irresponsible government. 
Further, a contractionary monetary policy innovation produces positive inflation 
throughout the monetary union rather than lowering it. 
Proof: Again the stability conditions associated with the unstable roots are 
informative.  In solving  for  the equilibrium,  the following stability  condition, 
associated with the fourth root, replaces the condition which had been associated 
with the second root and had been central to proving Proposition 1: 
This resembles the earlier condition, except that now inflation is a function not 
only of  monetary policy innovations, but also of  the current size of  debt. A com- 
plete solution for the equilibrium appears intractable. However, since a monetary 
contraction involves open market operations of  country-one debt, it is clear that  - 
blpt, will rise.  Since the government of  country one does not respond to the rise 
in debt with new taxes, the debt would grow exponentially.  The nominal inter- 
est  rate would rise, and the endogerious response of  monetary policy would  be 
to backtrack on part of  the monetary contraction.  Ultimately, the central bank 
will bail out the government  of  country one for the rise in debt plus interest in 
the meantime, so in the end money supply will rise above the initial level. Since 
money demand is a function of  expectfed  future inflation, money demand will drop 
immediately greater than the fall in money :;upply, producing inflation. 
Figure 2 illustrates this story by simulating a monetary contraction similar to 
that in Figure 1 (in this case, the shock takes the form Bt = .0001). However, here 
shock that produces positive inflation.  lo This result may be understood in terms 
of  the unpleasant monetarist arithmetic of Sargent and Wallace (1981), that any 
"Parameters are set at: 'a1 = 0.5, yll -=  0, 721 = 0.2, al  = 0.02, a2 = 0.01, ij, = y2 = 1,  -  - 
g, =  J2  = 0.3, TI = T2 = 0.306 (to reproduce realistic steady-state debt levels), P = 0.99. The 
shock is 6t = 0.0001 for t=l and 0 for  t>l. increase in one country's debt unbacked  by future taxes may cause household 
expectations of  a monetization sometime in the future. This expected future in- 
flation affects money demand and inflation immediately.  Another interpretation 
can be found in the fiscal theory of  price-level determination of  Woodford (1995) 
and Sims  (1995).  A  rise in debt held  by  private households  unbacked  by fu- 
ture taxes obligations makes households feel their nominal intertemporal wealth 
has increased.  Equilibrium requires, the resulting excess demand for goods be 
eliminated by a rise in price level to lower real wealth. 
5.  Case 3:  Fiscal Federalism F4uilibrium 
Proposition 3 has suggested  that redistributions of  wealth  between  home  and 
foreign  households can affect  the equilibrium  price  level,  although  the effects 
found  in  the Maastricht  class  of  equilibria  were fairly  small.  Is there a  case 
where  these effects  are large?  This  becomes possible  in  the present  model  if 
it is  augmented  with a  particular  form of  fiscal federalism.  Fiscal federalism, 
which has been proposed widely and in various forms in policy circles for the new 
European Monetary Union, transfer:;  wealth between countries.  By introducing 
a new means of  wealth redistribution, fiscal federalism opens up the possibility 
of  a new class of  equilibria in the present model. 
The previous two  classes  of  equilibria  were identified  by  manipulating the 
three roots that included  policy  parameters so that one of  these three exceed 
unity. It was taken as given that the sixth root would always be the  second of  the 
two unstable roots. It is tempting to ask if  the sixth root could be manipulated 
to be stable, thereby allowing both the second and fourth roots to be unstable 
at the same time (yll < 1  -  1, 712 :>  1. - 1, and a1 > 1.  ?I1 The simplest way  17  B  P) 
to manipulate the sixth root, which characterizes the rate of  growth in relative 
wealth  between  national households,  is  to introduce  a  tax rule that transfers 
wealth  between  them.  Consider  adding  721  on the left  side of  the household 
budget constraint (2.1),  and 722 for the budget constraing of  the other household, 
where: 
"1n  the terminology of  Leeper (1991), the question is if  there can be an equilibrium in which 
both monetary and fiscal policy are active simultaneously? This fiscal federalism tax rule states that for any asymmetric gain relative to the 
initial relative wealth position, a portion must be transfered to the country that 
has become relatively poorer. 
Various types of fiscal federalism along this line have been proposed for the 
European monetary union, either to promote equity or to substitute for the loss 
of  an independent monetary policy as a way of dealing with asymmetric shocks.12 
Fiscal federalism has the potential to improve welfare because the asset markets 
here between countries are incomplete.  Asset trade is limited to non-contingent 
government debt.  Perhaps surprisingly, even in this limited  asset  market, con- 
sumption can be smoothed remarkably well in the face of  asymmetric shocks to 
income.  If  output in one country were to fall, households could cushion the im- 
pact on current consumption by  borrowing  abroad.  This would take the form 
of  selling government bonds, and would be reflected in a drop in that country's 
net foreign asset position  (b,t). As a result of  this asset trade, the shock to con- 
sumption would be pooled almost equally among home and foreign households; 
it  would  be exactly pooled except for  the fact  that the poorer  household must 
generate enough saving to pay interest  payment,^ each period on its net foreign 
debt.  But fairly small fiscal  federal transfers can erase this vestige  of  market 
incompleteness. Since a country's consumption smoothing would be reflected in 
a drop in its net foreign assets (Lt),  transfers gauged to this measure of  relative 
wealth can be made to repatriate the interest payments due on this borrowing. 
Under such a rule, the complete-markets outcome could be mimicked, in which 
asymmetric shocks to consumption would be perfectly pooled. For the full inter- 
est payment to be repatriated, the policy parameter in the fiscal federal tax rule 
would need to be set exactly to  -  1, which is the steady-state real interest 
rate. 
For the sixth root of  the linear system to be stable, it must be that q!q  >  -  1. 
This is the result  if  the fiscal federal  transfer rule happens to be set by policy 
makers at a level even minutely higher  than the optimal level.  With the sixth 
"~ost  schemes of fiscal federalism proposed in prxtice would work to tax countries as a whole, 
based on the aggregate wealth in the country.  Thy  do not tax agents differently depending on 
individual wealth.  It is  appropriate to model these transfers  as not affecting the decisions of 
individual households, who do not see themselves as affecting the aggregate national wealth. 
While fiscal federalism is typically modelled as insuring against asymmetric shocks to income, 
which are not  present  in  this model,  the fiscal  federal arrangements  that currently  exist  in 
practice in Europe could be viewed as functions of  relative wealth.  Examples are the European 
structural funds, which gene~ally  transfer wealth from Northern to  Southern countries.  Another 
example would be transfers within Germany from western to the new eastern regions following 
German monetary union. root  inside  the unit  circle,  it  allows the fourth  root  to exceed  unity  without 
violating conditions for an equilibrium. This new class of equilibria, which allows 
a fiscal authority to follow a fiscally irresponsible policy rule at the same time the 
central bank fights inflation aggressively, mi11 be called here the Fiscal Federalism 
Equilibrium. 
Proposition 5:  In the Fiscal Federalism Equilibrium defined above  > 
1  1  1  1 
-  1,  yll < y -  1, 712 > p -  1, and  > y)  , a fall in the money supply generates 
inflation, despite the fact that the central bank fights inflation aggressively. 
Proof: Since condition (3.2) holds: 
it is clear that a positive shock to Qt will lower inflation just as in the Maastricht 
Equilibrium. But when this stability condition is combined with that associated 
with the fourth root  (equation 4.2), it reduces to the simple statement: 
Real debt of  the government in country one must never deviate from its initial 
steady-state level, or else given the lax fiscal rule in country one, it would grow 
explosively. This condition has the surprising implication that when a monetary 
contraction raises the level of nominal debt of the government in country one, price 
level must rise rather than fall, so as to keep the real level of  debt unchanged. To 
verify this conclusion, note that the path of  real money may be expressed: 
This states that a  positive  Qt, which lowers inflation, will  imply a rise in  real 
money supply.  The path of  the nominal money supply is: 
which similarly suggests a positive  Qt will imply a rise in nominal money supply, 
'  so long as debt levels are not very small.  H 
/ 
Figure 3 illustrates this equilibrium for a monetary contraction (which here is a shock opposite to that in figures one, Bt = -.01).13  This result is distinct from 
that in the Bailout Equilibrium.  There a monetary contraction produces inflation 
because of  the rational expectation that the fall in money supply will ultimately 
be reversed.  Here it is  the monetary contraction itself, not an implicit reversal, 
that produces the inflation.  This odd property results from the wealth redistri- 
bution discussed in  proposition 3 of  the Maastricht Equilibrium, although here 
fiscal federalism reverses and multiplies the implications of  this wealth redistrib 
ution for consumption and money demand.  The monetary contraction lowers the 
wealth of  the money-hating household as in the Maastricht Equilibrium, but here 
fiscal transfers subsidize the consumption of  this household. Since fiscal federal- 
ism unlinks consumption choices from wealth reflected in current asset holdings, 
consumption and money demand of  the money-hating household rises despite the 
fall in the current-period wealth position. The opposite happens for the money- 
loving household, and since money demand moves proportionately more with the 
money-lover, aggregate money demand falls.  In addition to reversing the effect on 
money demand, fiscal federalism also amplifies the effect.  Since consumption of 
the money-hating household rises despite the fall in current wealth, the wealth of 
this household falls further.  This additional shift in relative wealth initiates an- 
other round of  fiscal transfers. Fiscal federalism thus acts as a sort of  multiplier, 
raising consumption of  the money-hating household and equally lowering that of 
the money-loving household.  Since money demand of  the money lovers moves 
more strongly  with consumption, agg-regate money demand falls.  In fact  real 
money demand drops more than the fall in money supply that initially generated 
it, thus requiring a rise in the price level to clear the money market. 
This case illustrates one scenario in which wealth redistribution between het- 
erogeneous agents has especially strong implications for price-level determination. 
For this equilibrium to be generated in  practice would require fairly large fiscal 
transfers, with a value for h just above $ -  1. But since it might be argued that 
an optimal fiscal federal scheme would exactly pool consumption by setting q!q 
exactly equal to  -  1, transfers of  this size may not be unreasonable.  Further, 
such fiscal federal transfers are not unr~asonably  large compared to fiscal transfer 
systems already functioning within Europe between northern and southern coun- 
tries or transfers between western and eastern regions within Germany after their 
monetary union.14 
I3~ararneters  are set  at:  a1  = 1.2, 71, = 0,  7-21  = 0.2, 4 = 0.2,  a1 = 0.02,  a;? = 0.01, 
-  -  - 
y1 = 5, = 1, gl = g2 = 0.3, 51  = 72  = 0.306 (to reproduce realistic steady-state debt levels), 
= 0.99. The shock is  Bt = -0.01 for t=l and 0 for t>l. 
14Fiscal  federal transfers from western Germany to eastern German regions have remained at 6. Conclusion 
By modeling the price-level determination of  a twc~country  monetary union, sev- 
eral classes of  equilibria were identified, distinguished by their specifications for 
monetary and fiscal policy rules.  The first class of  equilibria offers some justifica- 
tion for the general type of  fiscal and monetary rules proposed for in the Maas- 
tricht Treaty, in which governments must limit the growth of  their debts and the 
central bank fights inflation vigorously.  This equilibrium suggested significant 
government heterogeneity can be accommodated within a monetary union with- 
out threatening the goal of  price stability.  This equilibrium also suggests that 
household  heterogeneity  gives monetary  policy a  reallocative dimension  which 
can affect the equilibrium price level. In the model of  the paper, this household 
heterogeneity enhances the potency of  a monetary contraction to lower inflation. 
A  second  class of  equilibria suggests some types of  fiscal  behavior  by  one 
member government  can  produce inflationary  results throughout the monetary 
union.  A  third  class  of  equilibria  suggests  that  household  heterogeneity and 
wealth redistribution from fiscal federalism can also generate surprising results 
for  price-level determination.  In the present  model, a  particular type of  fiscal 
federalism redistributes wealth among households that are heterogeneous in their 
demands for money. This redistribution can generate large changes in aggregate 
money demand and hence the equilibrium price level. 
The interdependence between monetary and fiscal policies has long been recog- 
nized as central to price-level determination.  The equilibria above suggest that 
the relatively novel arrangement of a monetary union, which may be on the hori- 
zon in Europe, adds new dimensions to this interdependence.  First, the common 
central bank must interact with multiple and potentially heterogeneous national 
governments. Further, it must interact with households potentially heterogeneous 
between nations in their demand for money.  The analysis highlights the impor- 
tance of  considering  the distribution of  wealth between heterogeneous agents in 
analyzing the determination of  the equilibrium price level. 
about 5 percent of west German GDP since the political and monetary union between the two 
groups commenced. 7. Appendix A: Linearized Model 
where: 
B1 = 
Constants: 8. Appendix B: Proofs of Existence and Uniqueness 
While counting roots is helpful in identifying classes of  equilibria, complete proofs 
of  existence  and  uniqueness  will  involve  more  than  this.  The root-counting 
method of  Blanchard and Kahn (1980) requires that expectational terms enter 
without linear dependencies, which is not true here (that is, H is not [I 0)'). The 
system may be rewritten: 
Let  the Jordan decomposition  of  A*  be  represented  by C-~JC  with  m  roots 
greater than unity in the lower right corner of J. Partition C and F into the top 
rows relating to the stable roots, C(1,:) and F(l,:),  and the lower rows relating 
to these m unstable roots, C(2,:) and F(2,:). A sufficient condition for existence 
and uniqueness of  a solution to the system is that C(2,  :)H* is square and full 
rank.  A necessary condition for existence is that the column space of  C(2,  :)H* 
spans that of  C(2, :)F. These criteria are discussed in Sims (1996), available at 
ftp://ftp.econ.yale.edu/pubsims/gensys. 
8.1. Case 1 
Consider a monetary union that requires both fiscal authorities be fiscally respon- 
sible (711 > $ -  1 and 712 > $ -  1) and that requires the common central bank 
fights inflation aggressively (al  > i).  Then the model implies: 
where  = - (j  -  1) (<,  - *) 
1-P 
and where J4 is defined i.n  the appendix A. This matrix is indeed square and full 
rank since $ (1 + w)  ,kO, satisfying the sufficient condition for existence and 
uniqueness of  an equilibrium. 8.2. Case 2 
If  one fiscal authority is fiscally irresponsible (yll < 1- -  1, 712 > 1  -  I) and the  P  P 
common central bank does not fight inflation aggressively enough (al < a), this 
arrangement would have a unique equilibrium. 
which is indeed square and full rank. 
8.3. Case 3 
Consider the case of  fiscal federalism presented in case 3 in the text, in which the 
monetary authority fights inflation aggressively while one of  the fiscal authorities 
1  1  is fiscally irresponsible.  (41  >  -  1, 711 < p -  1, 712 > p -  1,q  < a). In this 
case 
which is indeed square and full rank, as long as the two representative households 
do not have exactly identical preferences for money holding. 9. References 
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